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British government policy and the
concentration of ownership in
long-term care provision
CHRIS HOLDEN*
ABSTRACT
Most long-term care for older people in the UK has been provided by
independent organisations since the 1980s. This article draws on interviews
with various stakeholders in the sector, as well as secondary sources. The
evidence shows that government policies in the areas of funding, regulation
and the labour market are facilitating the concentration of long-term care
provision. Three areas of related concern are identi®ed: ®rstly, the eﬀects of
increased ownership transfers; secondly, issues relating to standardisation;
and thirdly, the possibility of a decline in the quality of care if local monopolies
emerge. It is concluded that government regulation must be concerned with
the structure of the market, as well as the conditions within care homes, if the
interests of residents are to be protected.
KEY WORDS ± Long-term care, private provision, regulation, economics,
policy.
Introduction
Since the 1980s shift towards the private provision of long-term care for
older people in the United Kingdom, there has been a substantial
growth in provision by large for-pro®t ®rms." Concentration of
ownership in the sector accelerated during 1996 and 1997 through a
series of mergers and acquisitions. Although in comparison to other
`industries', concentration in the long-term care sector is still relatively
low, it is likely to increase in the near future, giving rise to the
possibility of local monopolies and raising concerns about the nature
and quality of the services provided. Whether intentional or otherwise,
the main driver of this concentration process is government policy.
This article draws on both published sources and interviews with
stakeholders in the sector, including for-pro®t providers, voluntary
organisations working for older people, unions active in the sector, and
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inspection and registration oﬃcers.# The article begins with a review of
the underpinning economic logic and mechanisms of concentration as
apparent to date. It then analyses government policy and its likely
impact in three main areas: funding, regulation and the labour market.
Finally, the implications of concentration for the nature and quality of
care provided are discussed. It is concluded that government regulation
must be concerned with the structure of the market, as well as
conditions within care homes, if the interests of residents are to be
protected.
Concentration in the long-term care sector
The dominance of the independent sector in long-term care is evinced
by the fact that by 1998 it provided 88 per cent of all residential care
and nursing home places in the United Kingdom (Department of
Health, 1998a). As important is the recent trend towards concentration
in the sector, as revealed by the statistics compiled by the market
analysts, Laing & Buisson. Between 1988 and 1997, the major
providers (de®ned as organisations with three or more homes) more
than doubled their share of the for-pro®t care-home market (Laing &
Buisson, 1997:A 186). During calendar year 1998, their share of the
market rose by 3±6 per cent; in 1999 it rose by a further 1±7 per cent to
31±4 per cent; and in December 1999, there were 267 major for-pro®t
providers (Laing & Buisson 2000±2001: 185±6). There has however
been substantial consolidation in the sector. By the end of 1999, the ten
largest operators owned or leased 15±1 per cent of total United
Kingdom for-pro®t capacity, whilst the three largest owned or leased
8±1 per cent. According to Community Care Market News (CCMN)
(November 2000), a monthly magazine published by Laing & Buisson,
by November 2000 the largest of these operated 233 homes with 16,625
beds, whilst its nearest rival operated 145 homes with 8,326 beds. As
with other providers, both of these organisations grew rapidly during
1996 and 1997, as a result of multiple mergers and acquisitions.
Corporate penetration is greater in nursing home than residential
care provision. This is partly because nursing homes tend to be larger,
and consequently aﬀord greater economies of scale in provision. For
these to be realised, however, large-scale initial investment in property
is required, which large companies are best placed to make. Large
companies in this sector also make substantial use of bulk purchasing,
as for medical supplies. This gives them a signi®cant advantage over
the small homes which have traditionally characterised the sector.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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Andrews and Phillips (1998: 10), for example, found that in Devon,
70 per cent of the homes operating at or below their margins of
pro®tability had 15 or fewer registered beds. Many small proprietors
were disillusioned with the residential sector, and over one-third of
home owners stated that they would sell their business if it were
possible. Small homes are not necessarily owned by small companies, but
on the whole this is the case, partly because large companies have
commissioned more new buildings to achieve economies of scale. In
addition, ®nancial barriers to entry have risen for small providers, as
the average home size has increased, and as lending institutions have
imposed stricter terms as their con®dence in the long-term care market
has fallen (Laing & Buisson, 1999±2000: 178). Large ®rms by contrast
have made use of sale and leaseback, which allows them to separate the
costs of investing in property from actual operation, and thus expand
at a faster rate.
Funding policy
The private provision of long-term care expanded rapidly during the
1980swhentheConservativegovernmentsmadeitpossibleforresidents
entering private sector homes to claim board and lodging to pay for
their care (Bradshaw, 1988: 177). Residents being cared for in the
public sector could not use this provision, so local authorities
encouraged residents to opt for the private sector, which allowed the
release of income through the closure and sale of public facilities
(Harrington and Pollock, 1998: 1806). However, as the social security
budget spiralled, there was increasing concern about the rising costs as
well as the skewing of expenditure towards nursing and residential care
rather than community-based services. The government's solution was
the National Health Service and Community Care Act , the community
care provisions of which were implemented in 1993, and which made
local authorities responsible for purchasing care packages from a
`mixed economy' of providers. Authorities had however to spend 85
per cent of the `special transitional grant' (STG), which funded the
changed procedures, on independent sector services. The Conservative
government was thus able both to limit local authority spending and to
ensure the continued expansion of private provision. As Knapp et al.
(2001: 292) point out, however, one of the eﬀects of the 1990 Act was
to `undermine providers' fairly secure ®scal environments'.
Limitations on local authority budgets have subsequently led to
marked over-capacity in the private sector, as supply has exceededhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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eﬀective demand. Although there are signi®cant local variations, in
March 1999 overall occupancy rates stood at 85±7 per cent for private
nursing homes and 87±1 per cent for private residential homes (Laing
& Buisson, 1999±2000: 182). Yet local authority budgets have
consistently fallen behind what is needed to sustain the level of
provision, even taking into account the desire to support people in their
own homes where possible. The year 1999 saw the third annual
decrease in capacity across the sector, and the sixth year in succession
in which capacity growth fell short of what would be expected from
demographic pressure (Laing & Buisson, 1999±2000: 163). Never-
theless, private sector capacity continued to expand at the expense of
the public sector, as local authorities transferred their remaining
provision into the independent sector.
Research published by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Laing,
1998) claims that there are frequent disparities between the fees paid by
state agencies and the true cost of long-term care. It is estimated that
£80 million a year is spent on bridging the gap between care-home fees
and the amount that state agencies are willing to pay. The research
suggested that, at 1997}98 cost levels, fees of around £350 per week for
nursing home care oﬀered a reasonable return to an eﬃcient provider
of good quality amenities and care. This was £40 above the
Department of Social Security (DSS) rate, and more than most local
authorities were prepared to pay. The NHS funded about 15,000
residents ± fees paid by them were typically more generous than those
paid by local authorities, so the issue of disparities rapidly arose,
although they accounted for only a small minority of publicly-funded
residents. Only half the 95,000 residents receiving DSS `preserved
rights' payments were having their fees covered in full. The research
also identi®ed hidden disparities, as when the full fees met by local
authorities or the DSS were being cross-subsidised from other sources.
This included voluntary sector homes with access to their own
charitable funds, but also for-pro®t homes where self-paying residents
were being charged more than publicly-supported residents for
identical accommodation and care.
Whilst local authorities are constrained by the funding that they
receive from central government, they often have a near monopoly
purchasing position (monopsony), giving them considerable leverage
when setting fee rates. Where there is an absence of other signi®cant
purchasers, the providers' reliance on local authority income allows the
authorities to keep fee rates down. This imposes economic constraints
on both large and small providers, but it is the latter, which may be
operating at the limits of their ®nancial viability, which suﬀer most.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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Rather than engage in new-build, it has therefore been cost-eﬀective
for corporate providers to acquire smaller providers that may be
unable to survive in the current ®nancial climate. As one interview
respondent from a large provider put it: `there will always be one-man
bands that do exceptionally well [at providing high quality care], and
all credit to them. And when they're for sale we'll buy them'. However,
as argued below, this may change as a result of regulatory reform, with
large providers opting for new, purpose-built homes. Funding
restrictions also increase the likelihood of more mergers between large
®rms, as they respond to falling pro®ts by increasing their economies of
scale.
The overall issue of how long-term care should be paid for in the
future, given the demographic trends that are likely to raise the ratio
of people in need of such care, was examined by the Royal Commission on
Long-Term Care (Department of Health (DoH), 1999a). The govern-
ment rejected its main recommendation that personal care as well as
nursing care should be free to all: only nursing care, however de®ned,
is to be free, whilst personal care will continue to be subject to means-
testing (DoH, 2000). The Scottish parliament has since taken the
alternative course of agreeing to fund both nursing and personal care.
In England and Wales, whilst the unconditional state funding of
nursing care may alleviate some of the ®nancial problems of private
providers, it is likely to bene®t large providers disproportionately, since
they tend to provide more nursing than residential care. In its response
to the Royal Commission, the government did, however, commit
signi®cant amounts of money to funding `intermediate' care, with the
aim of increasing the independence of older people and reducing their
dependence on long-term care. To the extent that this is successful, it
may lead to occupancy in the sector falling still further, increasing the
®nancial pressures on providers. Some large providers have, however,
situated themselves so as to meet the new demand for intermediate care
beds. The overall eﬀect of funding restrictions on the sector has thus
been to hasten consolidation, because although the pro®tability of large
providers has been damaged, they are the best placed to weather such
conditions. The economic logic of the sector, in which economies of
scale are an important factor, is insistently towards concentration.
Regulatory policy
The regulatory system for long-term care is currently changing. Until
2002, the regulation of care homes was fragmented, with localhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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authorities responsible for registering and inspecting residential care
homes, and health authorities responsible for nursing homes. This
fragmentation has longbeen recognised asgeneratingseveral problems,
includingcomplaints that standards areinconsistentacross thecountry,
that local authority inspection units are insuﬃciently independent, and
that the division between health and residential care is arti®cial
(Burgner, 1996). The new Labour government's initial response to
these problems was the White Paper, Modernising Social Services (DoH,
1998b), which envisaged the creation of eight regional Commissions for
Care Standards in England, that would bring the regulation of all
residential, nursing home and domiciliary care for both adults and
children under their authority, and work to new national standards.
The Care Standards Act  legislated for these changes, and replaced
the Registered Homes Act  which had previously governed regulation.
However, instead of the eight regional commissions, a National Care
Standards Commission (NCSC) for England took over responsibility for
regulation in April 2002. In Wales, a new arm of the National
Assembly will carry out the regulatory function.
The Centre for Policy on Ageing was commissioned by the
Department of Health (DoH) and The Welsh Oﬃce to draw up a set
of National Required Standards for care homes for older people that will be
enforced by the NCSC. The draft standards were submitted early in
1999, and published later that year as Fit for the Future? (DoH, 1999b).
The ®nal version has been published as Care Homes for Older People:
National Minimum Standards (DoH, 2001a). The speci®ed physical and
staﬃng standards have produced much controversy. Among the
physical standards are that: all residents should have the choice of a
single room; that shared rooms in existing homes should account for no
more than 20 per cent of overall resident places; that single rooms
currently in use should be at least 10 m# in size; and that new
conversions should have rooms with a minimum size of 12 m# and
additional space for en suite facilities. The standards set out minimum
staﬀ ratios and quali®cation levels, including originally that one-third
of nursing home staﬀ should be registered nurses. This has been relaxed
following objections that it cannot be met, especially during the current
shortfalls in nurse recruitment. Nevertheless, these standards will
impose signi®cant new costs on all providers, and it is expected that
many small providers will be unable to meet them. Provider
associations such as the National Care Homes Association (NCHA) and the
Registered Nursing Homes Association (RNHA) have argued that the
proposals have not been properly costed, and will force many operators
out of business.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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According to Community Care Market News (February 1999), the
proposal that no more than 20 per cent of places in any given home
should be shared would be particularly damaging to some sections of
the industry. Large numbers of small converted homes, owned
primarily by small businesses, would be unable to meet these standards.
The DoH (1999b) Regulatory Impact Statement ± estimated that 20±23
per cent of independent sector residential homes, 12 per cent of
independent nursing homes, and 55 per cent of local authority homes
would not meet the space and amenity standards, whilst 54±56 per cent
of nursing homes would not meet the original staﬃng standards. Laing
& Buisson's analysis suggested that even these ®gures might be
optimistic (CCMN, Aug.}Sept. 1999). Although the government has
since signalled some ¯exibility over the implementation of the
standards, including a date of 2007 for the implementation of the
minimum room-size standard, most of the homes originally identi®ed
as being non-compliant would continue to be so (Laing & Buisson
2000±2001: 184).
As well as leading to the closure of many small homes, the standards
are likely to lead local authorities to continue their withdrawal from
provision, since many of their homes will be non-compliant, but fully
subject to regulation for the ®rst time (Jones, 1999: 2; Laing & Buisson,
1999±2000: 174). On the other hand, Community Care Market News
(February 1999) argued that providers of new-build and other homes
which did meet the standards would welcome them `in private at least'
because of their likely eﬀect in cutting excess capacity. Laing & Buisson
(1999±2000: 174) thought that the closure of small homes would lead
to new investment in `made to measure' facilities, which could best be
made by larger providers. If the standards do encourage a new wave
of new-build, this is likely to result in larger homes.
Thestandardsarethereforelikelytoencouragegreaterconcentration
within the industry. As Community Care Market News put it: `Despite the
currently depressed state of the sector ¼ there remain opportunities for
investors in the nursing and residential home sector. These opportuni-
ties will be all the greater if the proposed National Required Standards
do in fact precipitate an industry shake out' (CCMN, July 1999). The
magazine also predicted that closures would accelerate, possibly
leading to a shortage of supply if the transition period was too short.
This might lead to `a shift in the balance of power between providers
and purchasers, in favour of providers', which in turn would push up
fees (CCMN, Aug.}Sept. 1999). Indeed, by the end of 2000 there was
already evidence that the over-capacity in the sector was beginning to
turn to scarcity in some areas, as small businesses sold their propertieshttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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to take advantage of the boom in property prices before the regulatory
changes came into eﬀect (CCMN, Oct. 2000). Whilst to date low fees
have encouraged greater concentration in the sector, regulation policy
seems set to take over as the principal driver of concentration by
increasing the costs of compliance. Ironically, this may well lead to a
shift in the balance of power between private providers and state
purchasers, and therefore to higher fees. Indeed, there is the possibility
that local provider monopolies, or near monopolies, will emerge.
Labour market policy
We have seen that both funding and regulatory policy are tending to
reinforce concentration in the long-term care sector. Other government
policies and economic trends also have a bearing. General labour
market policies have a profound eﬀect on the sector, because it is
characterised by low waged and unskilled work. Whilst nursing homes
must have a minimum number of quali®ed nurses on duty at any given
time, the majority of care workers are unskilled and many are young,
female and part-time. Furthermore, despite some successes in striking
recognition deals, unionisation in the sector is generally low. As
interviews with oﬃcers from all of the major unions revealed, they have
had diﬃculty in organising a group of workers who are scattered
among relatively small workplaces and whose employers are generally
hostile to union recognition. Furthermore, Unison and the Transport and
General Workers Union have their healthcare strongholds in the public
sector, although the General, Municipal and Boilermaker's union has more
experience of organising in the private sector. This is set to change to
some extent as a result of the Employment Relations Act , which
implemented the proposals of the Fairness at Work White Paper
(Department of Trade and Industry, 1998). Thus, employers must
recognise unions where 50 per cent of the workforce are already
members, or where a majority (of at least 40 per cent of the workforce)
vote in favour.
The post-1997 Labour administration has introduced a series of
initiatives to establish minimum employment standards for those in low
paid or insecure work, and these will have a signi®cant eﬀect on the
sector. Other than the Employment Relations Act, these include the
`National Minimum Wage' (NMW), introduced in April 1999, and
the implementation of the European Union's (EU) `Working Time
Directive'.Ataninitialrateof£3±60perhour,withexceptionsof£3±00
per hour for 18±21 year olds, and £3±20 per hour for workers agedhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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22 years and older receiving training, the NMW was set substantially
below what most unions had campaigned for, and the government has
refused to consider an automatic up-rating. The main rate rose to
£4±10 in October 2001.
Yet the evidence suggests that the NMW will have a signi®cant
impact on the long-term care sector, although it has been estimated
that, prior to its introduction, less than 10 per cent of private care
home providers had prepared a strategy to deal with its likely impact
(CCMN, Feb. 1999). The NMW was expected to add `millions of
pounds' to the cost of care, with the number of business failures over
the two years following its introduction likely to increase as a result.
Laing & Buisson (1999±2000: 171) estimated that the cost to private
and voluntary care homes would be over £90 million per annum, falling
most heavily in the north of England. The impact of the NMW would
be uneven geographically, re¯ecting local labour markets, a ®nding
con®rmed by interviewees from large ®rms that run homes across the
country. Following the introduction of the NMW, the proportion of
workers earning at least £3±60 in private care homes more than
doubled (Department of Trade and Industry, 2000: 4±34). Laing &
Buisson's analysis of the impact of the NMW (CCMN, June 1999)
estimated that the rate of increase required to cover the costs ranged
from £7±09 per week in Yorkshire and the Humber to 80 pence per
week in London. Few local authorities in the areas most aﬀected
appeared to have made concurrent adjustments to fee levels, despite the
Low Pay Commission's recommendation that the government should
make extra funding available (Department of Trade and Industry,
2000: 4±43). The in¯ation pay awards granted to NHS nurses in 1999
and 2001, in response to the widely recognised recruitment shortfalls,
also increased the pressure for higher wages in the private sector (Laing
& Buisson 2000±2001: 180). Recruitment problems across all providers
of nursing services have also led to a rise in the use of (more expensive)
agency staﬀ.
The European `Working Time Directive' (WTD) was implemented
through the Working Time Regulations 1998, which came into force on 1
October 1998. These set a working time limit of an average of 48 hours
per week, which applies to casual and agency staﬀ as well as to those
on permanent contracts. A report on the eﬀects of the WTD (Pay and
Workforce Research, 1999) on care home operators found that the
increase in the wage bill resulting from the directive for the `average'
residential home was likely to be about £3,500 per annum, mainly as a
result of the entitlement to three weeks paid annual leave (which rose
to four weeks in November 1999). However, many unions havehttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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criticised the facility for individuals to opt out of the 48-hour limit (in
force until 2003), because it may provide a way for employers to
intimidate unorganised staﬀ (Trades Union Congress, 1998). The
report by Pay and Workforce Research found that the proportion of
employees working in excess of the 48 hour limit imposed by the
directive was less than 2 per cent, but that staﬀ in 74 per cent of
organisations had signed an agreement to work more than an average
of 48 hours per week where necessary. Both the NMW and WTD will
therefore raise costs further for providers, adding to funding restrictions
and the costs of the new regulatory measures in intensifying the logic of
concentration.
The implications of increasing concentration
It has been argued that government policies towards long-term care
will encourage greater concentration in the sector. Since this is not the
stated aim of these policies, it may perhaps be regarded as an
unintended consequence, yet there is a distinct economic logic to the
process. Through the combination of its funding and regulatory
policies, the government is seeking the highest possible quality-of-care
for the lowest possible cost; while its labour market policies are raising
the minimum standards of protection for workers in sectors, such as
long-term care, that employ `¯exible' labour on low wages. This
combination, of the highest possible quality-of-care and the lowest
possible cost, can best be provided by large ®rms that can draw upon
economies of scale, and for the same reason they will most be able to
meet the costs associated with raised employment conditions. Several of
these ®rms are international, and can thus draw on resources and
expertise from abroad.
There are three areas of concern associated with this process of
concentration: the eﬀects of increased ownership transfers; the
implications of standardisation; and the possibility of a decline in the
quality-of-care if local monopolies emerge. These will be discussed in
turn.Thelastintenseperiodofconcentration,during1996±97,involved
many mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The ownership transfers that
result from mergers between large ®rms can disrupt both staﬀ and
residents ± as several interviews indicated. Disruption for staﬀ can
relate to the problem of `cultural ®t', that is, trying to integrate staﬀ
from two or more organisations which operated in diﬀerent ways
(Johnson and Scholes, 1993: 234). Such problems may revolve around
integrating diﬀerent business systems or diﬀerent professional practices.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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Measures may also have to be taken to ensure that one of the previously
existing ®rms is not seen to dominate the others in the new structure.
Where these kinds of problem are not handled carefully, a ®rm may
lose numerous dissatis®ed staﬀ, and this has been the case for at least
one large private provider. Even where staﬀ are not lost, changes of
ownership, and therefore of employer, may induce a level of insecurity
in staﬀ whilst the new regime is established. Whilst such diﬃculties will
tend to be resolved over time, most ®rms experience a transitional
period of adjustment. Any new wave of M&As is likely to cause further
disruption.
Ownership transfers may have signi®cant implications for residents,
whether their home has been acquired from a small owner or another
large one. Both the continuity and the morale of staﬀ can have a
signi®cant impact on the well-being of older people (Wagner, 1988;
Edsbaik et al. 1995). However, it is also the case that changes in the
regime of the home often take place following a merger, as the
acquiring organisation standardises practices across all its facilities.
One interviewed home manager had overseen four changes of
ownership and regime in ®ve years. Such changes of regime may be
disruptive of the lives and expectations of residents; how this is
managed is therefore crucial. Potentially the most serious consequence
of such ownership transfers is the closure of a home and the transfer of
the residents to new accommodation. When a provider acquires new
stock, it normally seeks to bring all the homes in its acquired portfolio
up to the standard of its other homes. Acquired homes may not meet
these standards, and the organisation may not consider it cost-eﬀective
to renovate them. Transfers of residents should, however, be kept to a
minimum. Interview respondents from four diﬀerent voluntary
organisations working for older people said that residents ®nd such
transfers severely disruptive emotionally, psychologically and phy-
sically. In the worst cases, fatalities result. Interviews with registration
and inspection oﬃcers showed that changes inownership, and therefore
sometimes in management personnel, may also be disruptive of the
home's relationship with the regulating authority.
The second area of concern relates to standardisation. New Labour's
regulatory reforms for long-term care have commanded a considerable
consensus. Whilst they will be damaging to small providers, large
providers have generally welcomed the introduction of a system that is
expected to bring more consistency in registration, regulation and
enforcement. One of the large providers' chief criticisms of the old
system was that diﬀerent demands were placed upon homes belonging
to the same organisation by regulators in diﬀerent parts of the country.http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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This created problems for large private providers because they usually
aim to guarantee a common standard of quality across all their
facilities. They can then market themselves on the basis of a brand
name that lets the customer know what they can expect from homes
belonging to that organisation. Such providers have their own internal
quality assurance systems which aim to standardise the care delivered
in all their homes. These quality systems are usually based on process
standards that specify the tasks to be carried out by staﬀ. Such
standards are `Taylorist' in nature, insofar as they are based on
controlling the labour process by breaking it down into clearly speci®ed
tasks, rather than on the independent judgement of trained profes-
sionals (see Dominelli, 1997; Dominelli and Hoogvelt, 1996; Mintz-
berg, 1979; Pollitt, 1996).
Large private providers may therefore deliver relatively high quality
care, but this tends to be standardised across all their homes. If the
process of concentration results in local monopolies, this could have
important implications for choice. The community care reforms were
aimed partly at increasing choice for the `consumer' through diverse
private, voluntary and public sector provision in a `mixed economy' of
care. State services were often considered to be monopolistic and
provider driven (Griﬃths, 1988). Yet if government policy leads to a
reduction in the numbers of small operators, alongside the continuing
disposal of public provision, this may leave some purchasing authorities
(and their clients) with little choice. As Andrews and Phillips (1998:
10) point out: `Ironically, it is the smaller homes, being less
``institutional'', which sit best with the philosophy of care in the
community' (see also Andrews and Phillips, 2000).
The possibility of local monopolies prompts a third concern.
Currently, one incentive that for-pro®t providers have to deliver high
quality care is the competition from other providers. Without this,
there would be little rationale for the importance currently attached to
branding and marketing strategies. As we have seen, competition also
raises concerns, since it is part of the economic logic driving the
concentration process itself. But where competition is reduced, even
locally, a greater responsibility rests upon the regulatory system to
ensure high standards of care. Braithwaite (1993) has shown that the
introduction in the United States during the 1970s of strict structural
input standards, e.g. specifying the size of rooms and ®re prevention
measures in the design of buildings, hastened concentration within the
industry. Large companies could most eﬀectively meet the standards
by building large homes that achieved economies of scale, as may
happen in the UK. Braithwaite further argued that the combination ofhttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
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large homes, in which management is separated from actual care
provision, with regulation procedures that emphasised structural
inputs led to `ritualism' among providers. Ritualism entails providers
ful®lling the formal requirements speci®ed by the regulatory system
regardless of the outcomes for residents.
While it is not inevitable that such `ritualism' will develop in the
UK, especially since the National Minimum Standards are less heavily
weighted with `structural input' standards, it is clear that more
responsibility is placed upon the regulatory system when competition is
reduced, especially if budget restraint continues to squeeze the pro®t
margins of private providers. The regulators must therefore be
concerned not only with the quality of care delivered within homes, but
also with the providers' internal quality regimes and with the structure
of the market as a whole. Indeed, the voluntary organisation Counsel and
Care has called for a regulatory body for long-term care similar to those
which have been created for other privatised services. The Care
Standards Act  mandates the new National Care Standards Commission
with the task of keeping the government informed of trends in social
care and of monitoring both the quality and availability of provision.
How this will be interpreted in practice was unclear at the time of writing.
Conclusions
This article has suggested that British government policies towards and
that aﬀect long-term care will promote increased concentration in the
sector. The limited funds available to local authority purchasers,
regulatory changes, and policies designed to provide minimum levels of
protection for the staﬀ, are all raising the costs of the providers. The
larger providers are best placed to survive and expand in this
environment, and the anticipated concentration raises several con-
cerns: about the disruption arising from mergers and acquisitions,
about standardisation and the reduction of choice, and about a possible
decline in the quality of care if local monopolies emerge. Careful
monitoring studies of these outcomes are needed.
The shift towards private provision during the 1980s introduced the
disciplines and `logic' of markets into long-term care provision more
than any other British welfare service, but nonetheless government
policy remains the dominant factor in determining how market
incentives will shape the sector. There is some evidence that the
government is aware of the trends outlined in this article. Thehttp://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 May 2013 IP address: 194.80.229.244
92 Chris Holden
document, Building Capacity and Partnership in Care (DoH, 2001b), is in
eﬀect the second instalment of the `concordat' with the private health
sector. It stipulates extra funds for local authorities in return for a
commitment to stabilise the market and to take into account the needs
of social care providers through collaborative planning. One danger of
the arrangement is that it may override the intended bene®ts of
competition, partly through long-term block contracts (with large or
small private providers), that will leave individual users with little
choice of home. The paradox of the market in social care is that the
government has to intervene repeatedly to balance the needs of
residents, providers (both large and small), staﬀ, and the public purse.
Intervention aimed at advancing the interests of any one of these is also
likely to have (possibly unintended) consequences for the others. This
indicates a key problem in the shift towards quasi-markets: trying to
combine the best of the market and of public service, through the
purchaser-provider split, may lead not to an ideal `best of both worlds',
but to fundamental contradictions. The long-term development of the
sector will depend ultimately on whether the government intends to
rationalise the sector and reap the cost savings, of forcing smaller
providers out of the market, or whether it seeks to cushion the smaller
providers by extending attempts to manage the market, as with
Building Capacity and Partnership. Much depends on how the National Care
Standards Commission interprets its role of monitoring overall develop-
ments in the market, and on the proposals it makes to government.
NOTES
1 The term `for-pro®t' is used interchangeably with the term `private' to refer to
all providers operating on a commercial basis. The term `independent' is used as
an umbrella term to encompass all non-state providers, including both for-pro®t
®rms and voluntary providers.
2 This article arises from a larger research project, and is intended to give an
overview of signi®cant developments in the UK long-term care sector. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with respondents from organisations chosen
on a purposive basis. For an account of this larger project, see Holden (2002).
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